ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In order to obtain energy efficient message transmissions, broadcasting and multicasting communication scenarios are widely performed in wireless network settings. Due to the open air message deliveries and unreliable connection establishments, the wireless communication links are always considered to be insecure. Therefore, the key security characteristics that should be incorporated with all types of communication scenarios in wireless networks are identified as confidentiality, authentication, and integrity. The sender needs to guarantee that the message can only be read by authorized receivers (confidentiality) whereas, the receivers need to ensure about the correctness of the origin (authentication) and content of the actual message (integrity). These security requirements are efficiently achieved by a signcryption scheme.
A generalized signcryption (GSC) scheme provides either confidentiality or authentication or a combination of both. Moreover, since a GSC advocates all these security features accompanied by the possibility of sending multiple messages to different receivers in the same communication phase, a GSC scheme can be deployed in constrained wireless devices also.
The application scenarios of signcryption schemes have gone beyond the theoretical derivations to the real-time application level. In [1] , an application for multi-receiver identity-based schemes has been proposed in the context of Mobile Ad hoc networks (Manets) to deal with malicious nodes. Suppose that every node has a surveillance mechanism. Then, if one node detects that its neighbor node has malicious behavior, the node sends a warning message and broadcasts this message to the whole Manet using the multi-receiver scheme. Once a node reaches a given threshold of warnings, the node is excluded from the network. Other applications are related to the key management in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [2, 3] . Signcryption is used here to share the key between the sink node and the network nodes.
In this paper, we propose the most efficient signcryption and a GSC scheme from literature, that use elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) primitives and avoid the computationally heavy bilinear operations, satisfying besides the classical security properties also forward secrecy and public verification. The signcryption scheme is an extension to multiple receivers of the tripartite signcryption scheme from [4] , where we first correct a serious security problem. This scheme is then further extended to a GSC.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview about the related work. Section 3 explains the key definitions and assumptions used. In Section 4, we propose the new signcryption scheme and the extended GSC scheme. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the security and the performance aspects of the schemes respectively. We show how to apply the GSC scheme for key management of WSNs in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
The concept of public key signcryption was introduced by Zheng [5] in 1997. The significance of a signcryption scheme is that it simultaneously generates both encryption and signature in a single phase. Consequently, cryptographic properties such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation are more efficiently obtained compared to the traditional approaches, which first encrypt and then sign the message. Since 1997, many variants of signcryption schemes with different cryptographic properties have been proposed. More particularly, the identity-based signcryption scheme was firstly introduced by Malone in 2002 [6] . In [7] , Duan et. al. proposed the inclusion of multi-receiving property to the identity-based signcryption schemes. Since then, several other identity-based multi-receiving schemes were suggested in many previous literature [8] .
Most of the proposed signcryption systems in literature make use of the computationally heavy operations of bilinear pairing. The first ECC based signcryption scheme was suggested in [9] , which saved about 58% computational cost and about 40% communication cost compared to the signature-then-encryption approach. In [10] , a recent overview is given of all the different signature schemes based on ECC that were proposed in literature. In particular, they were compared with respect to the security attributes of confidentiality, integrity, authentication, unforgeability, non-repudiation, forward secrecy, and public verification. Papers [2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] were suggested to satisfy all the required security features of a signcryption scheme.
After thorough evaluation of these papers, we concluded that papers [2, 12, 15] have exactly the same structure. Papers [3] and [11] claim to satisfy non-repudiation and public verifiability, but clearly do not since the private key of the receiver is required to perform the steps of the unsigncryption procedure in the protocol. Reference [15] consists of a completely different approach but also requires much more ECC operations. Finally, in [13] a serious security weakness exists because the sender sends the parameter s to the receiver, where s=tw a . Here w a represents the private key of the sender and t is a parameter that can be computed by the receiver in the protocol. As a consequence, the receiver is able to derive the private key of the sender.
Another signcryption scheme from 2013 satisfying all the possible required properties, not mentioned in the review [10] , can be found in [4] . However, there the number of receivers is limited to two, which is not pragmatic in real-time wireless systems. Moreover, a serious security problem exists in the key generation of the scheme.
To summarize, our proposed signcryption scheme is an extended and corrected version of the scheme from [4] . We show that this scheme is more efficient than the other existing full securityfeatured signcryption schemes from [2, 12, 15] based on basic elliptic curve (EC) operations. In addition, we extend the signcryption scheme to a generalized one by adding one extra EC multiplication at sender side.
SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
First, we discuss the security problem of the tripartite signcryption scheme of [4] . Then, we correct the problem and extend the scheme to a signcryption scheme with multiple receivers instead of only 2. Next, we extend this signcryption scheme to a GSC scheme with a limited additional cost.
This section explains the key definitions and the assumptions used for deriving the proposed scheme. We consider the sender S and a number of n receivers U={U 1 ,...,U n }, where n≥2. The identities of the sender and the receivers are respectively denoted by ID S and ID j with 1≤j≤n. The ECC primitives are taken from the standardized curve parameters as given in [16, 17] , where G is the base point generator of the curve of prime order p, defined in the finite field F q , with q prime. The sender's private and public keys are respectively denoted by d S and Q S . Each entity in the scheme has its own private-public key pair, whereas in particular, the j-th receiver's key pair is (d j , Q j ) for 1≤j≤n. The generation of these key pairs is performed by a trusted Public Key Generator (PKG) and is explained in the next section. The node identities and the corresponding public keys are publicly known.
Operation H is a one-way cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA2 or SHA3) that results in a number of F q . The encryption algorithm can be considered as the well known AES or the lightweight cryptographic algorithm PRESENT. It is assumed that the given cryptographic operations and the EC parameters are identically implemented and performed at each participating entity. The original message sent by the sender is represented as M. The ciphertext C, is obtained by encrypting the message M using the key K, C=E K (M). The concatenation of two messages M 1 and M 2 is denoted by M 1 |M 2 .
For the definition of the GSC scheme, we need to introduce two assumptions, related to the hash function on the zero message and the encryption/decryption of a message under the zero-key. In particular,
PROPOSED SCHEME
Security problem of previous scheme
The main weakness of the scheme in [4] takes place in the key generation. The private keys for the participants are defined by the PKG, using the identity of the user and the private key of the PKG d k . Thus, the private key of user a is derived as d a =d k H(ID a ). Consequently, any user is able to derive the private key of the PKG. This also means that any user is able to establish own key pairs in the name of the PKG. Another serious problem is that every time a key pair of a user needs to be revoked and reset, it implies a change in either the identity of the user or the private key of the PKG and thus also all other users' key pairs.
A last issue is that the system is called an identity-based scheme. Following the definition of identity-based cryptography [18] , the public key should consist of the identity of the user. Here, the identity of the user is only involved in the private key. From a security point of view, an identity-based cryptosystem guarantees the link between the public key and a given identity. In [4] , this link is created by including identity-related information any time the public key of a user occurs. However, the question still remains how the valid pair, consisting of identity and public key, reaches the user. An attacker can easily mislead a user by for instance placing his public key with another identity ID o , allowing him to read a message intended to that particular identity ID o . An attacker could also generate its own key pair, since the particular form of the private key is not exploited in the scheme. We see two possibilities in solving this issue.
• The data containing the pairs (identity and public key of each user) is publicly published, but a third party independently checks all changes on the content.
• The most secure way would be to transmit the paired information of identity and public key by applying the signature scenario of the GSC scheme that we develop in this paper.
It needs to be mentioned that both approaches are less efficient than the key management in identity-based crypto. However, identity based crypto is typically achieved by means of bilinear operations, which we explicitly want to avoid due to their computationally heavy requirements. Since transmission costs are fundamentally smaller (order of 1000) than the computation costs of pairing operations, we will show that even with an extra communication phase of the required public key information with the signature scenario of the GSC scheme, we are still able to obtain a considerable more efficient system.
Proposed Signcryption Scheme
A signcryption scheme consists of 3 different phases. The first phase is the key generation of the private and public keys of the participants. The second part handles the signcryption, executed by the sender. In the third phase, the receivers perform the operations individually, which is referred as the unsigncryption process. We describe these different processes more into detail.
Key Generation
We now correctly apply the idea for the integration of the identity in the private key as in [4] . Let us also consider a PKG with (d k ,Q k ) the master private and public key pair. We also include a parameter r, which is a random value in F q . It allows the revocation of the user's credentials and the issue of new credentials without changing the private master key or the identity of the user. The private key and public key of S and the users U j with 1≤j≤n is now defined as
The private keys are securely delivered to the users of the system in off-line mode. The master public key Q k is stored in all nodes. The tuple (ID i , Q i , H(ID i |Q i )) is made publicly available for all users U i in the system. The last element in this tuple is to ensure the link between the identity and the public key.
Signcryption
This process consists of 6 steps. Denote by M=(M 1 |...|M n ) the message to be encrypted for the corresponding users of the system U=(U 1 ,...,U n ) where each M j is intended for user U j with 1≤j≤n. We want to note that the multi-receiver property, exactly one message to all receivers, can also be easily included in the algorithm by integrating the key derivation of [19] after step 3 of the signcryption and step 5 of the unsigncryption procedure.
In order to start the signcryption process, the identities and the corresponding public keys of the receivers (Q 1 ,...,Q n ) are queried by the sender. Let us here assume that these values are securely stored in a public environment (cf. first approach). The following steps are then performed by the sender.
1. The sender chooses a random parameter r 1 and computes k S = r 1 
Unsigncryption
Any individual receiver U j , with 1≤j≤n can now execute the following process. A preliminary step before the unsigncryption can start, is to request or query the corresponding public key Q S of ID S and to check its integrity by means of the hash H(ID S |Q S ). Then, all required info is available to check the signature and decrypt the message of the transmitted data s|h|C|ID S |U. 
The intermediate point

Generalized Signcryption Scheme
There are 3 main scenarios in a GSC scheme.
• Signcryption scenario: sender and receivers are determined and the message is encrypted and provided with a signature.
• Signature scenario: Only the sender is determined. The message is only provided with a signature and no encryption is performed.
• Encryption scenario: Only the receivers are determined. The message is encrypted and signed by an anonymous sender.
We now show how the scheme from the previous paragraph with some small adaptations can be transformed to a GSC scheme. The main trick we use is to add an extra random value r 2 for which the corresponding EC point R 2 =r 2 Q k is calculated. This point R 2 is also included in the transmitted message. As a consequence, R 2 can be used as a kind of temporary public key and r 2 as the corresponding temporary private key of the sender. Thanks to the integration of this pair (r 2 , R 2 ), the encryption scenario of the GSC scheme, where the sender is unknown, can be defined.
The key generation is the same as described above. The input parameters of the GSC scheme are determined by
We now describe the different modes.
Signcryption Scenario
The input of the system in signcryption scenario consists of
The protocol is very similar as the signcryption protocol from the previous paragraph. The main differences are
• The introduction of R 2 (step 2 in signcryption mode) as replacement of Q S (step 1 in unsigncryption mode).
• Replacement of d S by r 2 in the computation of the signature (step 6 in signcryption mode).
• The additional transmission of R 2 in the message and the corresponding inclusion into the input of the hash to ensure integrity of the transmitted message.
The different steps are summarized in Table 2 . 
Signature Scenario
The input of the system in the signature scenario consists of (ID S The different steps are summarized in Table 3 . 
k S =P
For all j, k j =H(0)=0
h' = H(k S |C|ID S |R 2 |0)
4. For all j, C j =E 0 (M j ) =M j C =(M 1 |...|M n ) 4. h' =h?
h =H(k S |C|ID S |R 2 |0)
5. k j =0 6. s =r 1 -hr 2 
M j =D 0 (C j )
Send s|h|R 2 |C|ID S |0
Encryption Scenario
The input of the system in the encryption scenario consists of (0,0,0, U 1 , d 1 , Q 1 ,. ..,U n , d n ,Q n ), since the sender is unknown. Due to the introduction of the pair (r 2 , R 2 ) that takes over the role of the sender's key pair (d S , Q S ), the encryption scenario consists of the same operations as the signcryption scenario. The different steps are summarized in Table 4 . To conclude, with an extra cost of one point multiplication (cf. step 2 at sender side in the scheme) and the transmission of one extra ECC point, a GSC scheme is obtained from the signcryption scheme. Moreover, it should be noticed that thanks to the introduction of an extra random value r 2 , the private key of the sender is better protected. In [20] , it is considered as a weakness to make the private key dependent of only one random value. This is also the case in the first proposed signcryption scheme, where s=r 1 -hd S and s,h are part of the transmitted message.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we proposed 2 schemes, a signature scheme and a GSC scheme as extension of this signature scheme. The extension of the signature scheme to the GSC scheme consists of the inclusion of an extra tuple (r 2 ,R 2 =r 2 Q k ), that takes over the role of a temporary private and public key pair. The parameter R 2 is on the one hand included in the transmitted message. On the other hand, at the place where an operation was involved with the private key of the sender (step 6 of signcryption procedure), the parameter r 2 is used. Consequently, due to the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), the security of the GSC scheme is completely determined by the security of the signcryption scheme. Therefore, we can here restrict our discussion to the security of our first proposed signcryption scheme. Let us start with showing the correctness of the protocol. Next, we shortly discuss the most important security properties of the scheme.
Correctness of the protocol
There are 2 checks to be made. One check is related with the verification of the hash and the other with the derivation of the EC point. Both are based on the same principle.
Verification of the Hash
We need to check if the determination of k S by sender and receiver corresponds to each other. Let us start from the side of the receiver and show that we obtain the same calculation as the
Derivation of Point on EC
Again sender and receiver have a different calculation for the computation of the shared secret key k j . Starting from the receiver leads to the following result:
Other Security Properties
The security of the whole scheme is based on the ECDLP. It is exploited two times, first to derive a common shared EC point and second for ensuring authentication and integrity of the message. Let us now shortly describe the different security properties of the protocol. Again, for the same reason as explained above, we focus on the base signcryption scheme.
Public Verifiability and Non-repudiation
Thanks to the particular construction of the private and public keys of the entities, a public verifiable scheme is created. This means that any third party without knowledge of the private key of sender or receiver(s) can validate the signcrypted message. Since anyone with knowledge of the master public key Q k in the scheme can execute the computations as shown in the derivation of k S above. Then, anyone can also check the value of the hash h. As a consequence, also non-repudiation, allowing any third party to validate the origin of the message, is obtained in the scheme.
Unforgeability
The scheme is also unforgeable, which means that only the intended sender can produce a valid message-signature pair. No other entity can send a message s|h|C|ID S |U, since the values s, h and C are either directly or indirectly linked with the given identity ID S or the private key d S of the sender S. First of all, with respect to the public verifiable part of the protocol, being the check of the parameter h, it is not possible due to the ECDLP for deriving the random value r 1 in the computation of a correct value for s. Secondly, also a valid value for the secret key k j is impossible to construct without knowledge of the private key of the sender due to the ECDLP.
The random value r 1 is generated in the beginning of the protocol. This value is integrated in all the steps of the protocol where the identity or private key of the sender is involved. The first step is in the computation of the EC point shared with the receivers. The second step is related to the derivation of the parameter k S , which leads to the first validity check at the side of the receiver. As a consequence, no replay attacks can be performed in order to forge a signature.
Message Integrity
It is clear that the message integrity is obtained thanks to the hash h, transmitted in the message. This hash value includes information of the ciphertext C, the values k s , ID S and U. The value k S depends on the random value r 1 and cannot be replayed.
Authentication
In the signcryption scheme the authentication of the identities of sender and receivers are obtained thanks to 2 measurements. First, the key pairs, generated by the PKG, are based on the identities of sender and receiver. This follows from the fact that the private keys, incorporating the identities, of the involved entities are used. Also at the moment the public key is used from an entity, the corresponding identity is included in the operation, which creates a dependency between the public key and the identity as is the case in identity-based cryptography. We assumed that alternations to the list (ID i , Q i , H(ID i | Q i )) are independently verified by a third party.
Forward Secrecy
Even if the private key of the sender is revealed, an attacker is not able to derive the secret key k j for the decryption of messages, sent in the past. This key k j is constructed using a random value r 1 , which is deleted in the sender's memory after sending the message. The value r 1 cannot be derived from k S , due to the ECDLP.
EFFICIENCY
It is fair to compare our scheme with other systems in literature that achieve the same (i.e. all required) security attributes and also restrict to basic EC operations. In any case, these systems are much more efficient than the ones that include the computationally heavy pairing operation. As mentioned in [21] , for binary fields, pairing operations behave almost 5 times worse than EC point multiplications operations in timing and energy performance. For prime fields, the difference increases to a factor of 16. Consequently, one pairing operation has a huge impact in a signcryption protocol, taken into account that our signcryption scheme with one receiver only requires two point multiplications from sender's side.
As follows from the review paper [10] and our analysis afterwards as explained in Section 2, only the schemes from [2, 12, 15] can be used for comparison. The schemes from these three papers turn out to all have exactly the same structure.
Moreover, applying the same trick of including an extra random value r 2 and a corresponding EC point R 2 , makes it possible to extend their signcryption scheme also to a GSC scheme. Table 5 compares the most computationally heavy operations between our signcryption scheme and the ones of [2, 12, 15] . These operations include the EC point multiplications (PM) and point additions (PA). We also compare the number of operations for the corresponding GSC schemes, taking into account that the scheme of [2, 12, 15] is extended the same way as proposed in this paper. As can be concluded from Table 5 , our signcryption scheme requires one PM less at sender side than the scheme of [2, 12, 15] . In addition, an inverse field operation is required in the schemes [2, 12, 15] to compute the signature parameter s, while we only need a subtraction. The same difference is consequently translated into the corresponding GSC schemes, where only 1 extra PM operation is required at the sender's side. Consequently, for 1 receiver, our signcryption scheme outperforms the other existing ones with 33% and our GSC scheme with 25%.
When we want to apply the second proposed approach, being the application of the signature scenario of the GSC scheme, for delivering the pairs identity and public keys of the receivers to the sender, we have to add 2 extra PM and 1 PA. As shown in [21] , one pairing operation requires around five times more energy consumption that one PM. Consequently, our scheme is able to offer the same security objectives than an identity-based signcryption scheme and will always be more efficient than these identity-based proposals.
APPLICATION IN KEY MANAGEMENT
We now shortly discuss the applicability of our GSC scheme for the key management of WSNs. Let us assume that there is a PKG that generates the private and public keys following the method explained in Section 4 and distributes the private keys in off-line mode to the different nodes of the network.
There is one powerful base node (BN) that decides the cluster formation, based on the energy level and the location. The identity and public key of the BN is also stored at each node. The BN contains a list of sensor node identities and corresponding public keys. The following steps are then performed in the network to manage the key distribution among the nodes.
1. The BN broadcasts an info update request to all nodes in the network. This message only needs a valid signature from the BN. 2. Each individual node sends its info to the BN, using the signcryption scenario. 3. Based on that information, the BN calculates the candidate cluster heads. For each cluster, the list, containing the members of each cluster and their corresponding cluster head, is send to all nodes in that cluster. Note that in order to completely determine an entity in the network, the identity should be accompanied with the corresponding public key. This message is only signed. 4. The BN signcrypts a secret shared key for each of the cluster heads. 5. The cluster heads signcrypt a secret group key for the whole cluster. Note that this corresponds with the multi-receiver signcryption scheme. The nodes first verify if the identity of the sender corresponds with one of the nodes contained in the previous message. 6. Suppose that every node contains a surveillance mechanism, as considered in [1] . The node can than detect malicious behavior of its neighbor nodes and send this information in encrypted mode to the BN. Table 6 summarizes the number of computationally heavy operations, PM and PA, corresponding to each step, executed by the BN, cluster nodes, and the remaining sensor nodes. Let m denote the number of different clusters and t the number of warning messages send from the nodes of the network to the BN. The total number of operations in the table corresponds with the total executed from step 1 till 5, i.e. the key management of one single phase. Table 6 . Number of PM and PA in key management protocol using our GSC.
Step 
CONCLUSIONS
A very efficient signcryption scheme that satisfies all the required security features, based on the basic EC operations, is presented in this paper. A simple trick is proposed to extend the signcryption scheme to a generalized version with a very small additional cost of one extra PM at sender side. Both schemes are shown to be more efficient than the others in literature. As application of the GSC scheme, we illustrate the key management in WSNs using this protocol.
